docs(phase-1/m3.4): M3 status + scripted key-envelope legs; plan handed to M4
Closes milestone M3 (DESKTOP_PHASE_PLAN §5). Code (one addition): --key-export / --key-import CLI legs in Main.kt — the SecurityActions menu's exact codec calls, headless. This makes the pending physical-phone leg a one-liner once a Waydroid container is live (recipe recorded in the feasibility doc). Docs: DESKTOP_FEASIBILITY.md gains the M3.1–M3.4 status section with the actual run output (leg A/B, KEYENV logs, 0600 ls lines); plan §1 lists the two crypto legs among the must-stay-green commands; §5 marked DONE; first-actions now point a fresh session at M4 task 1. Exit criteria, per the plan's wording: - encrypted desktop library passes EncryptionVerifier's trial-decrypt sweep: MET (leg A verified=1 failed=0, wrong key -> AEAD failure count, leg B relaunch all-ok). - phone-exported recovery key decrypts on desktop: MET at format level (shared codec source, 84B INCKEY1 envelope, AEADBadTagException on wrong passphrase, byte-identical key into a fresh 0600 file); the physical phone export is FLAGGED pending (Waydroid container FROZEN, start is sudo-gated) with the exact re-run recipe — not assumed done. Verified: ./gradlew assembleDebug, :core:data-jvm:smoke, :spike:data-jvm:run, :desktopApp:run --self-test, and both crypto legs — all green in one final pass (one self-test teardown hang under the compositor, rc=124, clean on immediate rerun — recorded, environmental).
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@@ -51,12 +51,16 @@ import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.intPreferencesKey
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import java.io.File
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import java.io.File
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import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
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import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
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import java.io.FileOutputStream
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import java.io.FileOutputStream
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import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
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import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
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import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
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import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.first
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import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.first
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import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
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import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
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import kotlinx.coroutines.runBlocking
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import kotlinx.coroutines.runBlocking
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import kotlinx.coroutines.withContext
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import org.incido.compose.data.backup.BackupBridge
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import org.incido.compose.data.backup.BackupBridge
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import org.incido.compose.data.backup.EncryptedBackupCodec
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import org.incido.compose.data.backup.EncryptedBackupCodec
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import org.incido.compose.data.backup.EncryptedKeyCodec
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import org.incido.data.crypto.AesGcmFieldCipher
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import org.incido.domain.model.Note
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import org.incido.domain.model.Note
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import org.incido.domain.repository.NoteRepository
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import org.incido.domain.repository.NoteRepository
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@@ -100,6 +104,12 @@ fun main(args: Array<String>) {
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val cryptoSelfTest = "--crypto-self-test" in args
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val cryptoSelfTest = "--crypto-self-test" in args
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val cryptoReopen = "--crypto-reopen" in args
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val cryptoReopen = "--crypto-reopen" in args
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val cryptoPassphrase = args.argAfter("--crypto-passphrase") ?: "selftest-passphrase"
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val cryptoPassphrase = args.argAfter("--crypto-passphrase") ?: "selftest-passphrase"
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// Recovery-envelope file legs: --key-export writes the INCKEY1 envelope
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// the phone's Settings screen writes; --key-import reads one (e.g. a
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// REAL phone export) with the passphrase and installs the key — the
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// scripted version of the SecurityActions import menu.
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val keyExport = args.argAfter("--key-export")
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val keyImport = args.argAfter("--key-import")
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println("=== Incido (desktop) — Phase 1 M1b ===")
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println("=== Incido (desktop) — Phase 1 M1b ===")
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println("JVM : ${System.getProperty("java.vendor")} ${System.getProperty("java.version")}")
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println("JVM : ${System.getProperty("java.vendor")} ${System.getProperty("java.version")}")
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@@ -141,6 +151,8 @@ fun main(args: Array<String>) {
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cryptoSelfTest = cryptoSelfTest,
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cryptoSelfTest = cryptoSelfTest,
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cryptoReopen = cryptoReopen,
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cryptoReopen = cryptoReopen,
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cryptoPassphrase = cryptoPassphrase,
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cryptoPassphrase = cryptoPassphrase,
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keyExport = keyExport,
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keyImport = keyImport,
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onExit = ::exitApplication,
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onExit = ::exitApplication,
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)
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)
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}
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}
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@@ -165,6 +177,8 @@ private fun NotesWindow(
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cryptoSelfTest: Boolean,
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cryptoSelfTest: Boolean,
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cryptoReopen: Boolean,
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cryptoReopen: Boolean,
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cryptoPassphrase: String,
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cryptoPassphrase: String,
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keyExport: String?,
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keyImport: String?,
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onExit: () -> Unit,
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onExit: () -> Unit,
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) {
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) {
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val notes by remember(repository) { repository.observeAll() }
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val notes by remember(repository) { repository.observeAll() }
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@@ -352,6 +366,51 @@ private fun NotesWindow(
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prefs[intPreferencesKey("window_height")] = height
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prefs[intPreferencesKey("window_height")] = height
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (keyExport != null || keyImport != null) {
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LaunchedEffect(Unit) {
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delay(800)
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withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
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if (keyExport != null) {
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// Same codec call the SecurityActions export menu makes —
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// the exact envelope the phone's ObjectBoxKeyProvider writes.
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val out = File(keyExport)
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out.writeBytes(app.keyProvider.exportRecoveryKey(cryptoPassphrase.toCharArray()))
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val magic = out.readBytes()
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.copyOf(EncryptedKeyCodec.MAGIC.size)
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.contentEquals(EncryptedKeyCodec.MAGIC)
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println(
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"KEYENV exported=${out.length()}B to $out " +
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"(magic=${if (magic) "INCKEY1 ok" else "BAD"})",
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)
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}
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if (keyImport != null) {
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val bytes = File(keyImport).readBytes()
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val rejectedWrongPw = runCatching {
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app.keyProvider.importRecoveryKey(bytes, "wrong-pass".toCharArray())
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}.isFailure
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val result = runCatching {
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app.keyProvider.importRecoveryKey(bytes, cryptoPassphrase.toCharArray())
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if (app.settingsRepository.snapshot().isEncryptionActive) {
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app.cipherHolder.cipher = AesGcmFieldCipher(app.keyProvider)
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}
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app.noteCryptoService.verifyAll()
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}
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result.fold(
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onSuccess = { v ->
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println(
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"KEYENV import ok wrong-pw=" +
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(if (rejectedWrongPw) "rejected" else "LEAKED!") +
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" verify verified=${v.verifiedNoteIds.size} failed=${v.failedNoteIds.size}",
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)
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},
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onFailure = {
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println("KEYENV import FAILED: ${it.javaClass.simpleName}: ${it.message}")
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},
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)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (cryptoSelfTest || cryptoReopen) {
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if (cryptoSelfTest || cryptoReopen) {
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LaunchedEffect(Unit) {
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LaunchedEffect(Unit) {
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delay(800) // past the first frame; assertions ride the flows, not frame one
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delay(800) // past the first frame; assertions ride the flows, not frame one
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@@ -499,6 +499,111 @@ before a 3 s-delayed screenshot — burst-capture spectacle at 1 s
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intervals; `waydroid shell` needs sudo, but `waydroid app install` and
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intervals; `waydroid shell` needs sudo, but `waydroid app install` and
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`pkill -f org.incido.app` from the host need none.
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`pkill -f org.incido.app` from the host need none.
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**M3.1 — `:core:settings`: DONE.** `UserSettings` + `SettingsRepository`
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moved to a plain `kotlin("jvm")` module with package
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`org.incido.compose.data.settings` kept, so the Android diff is two
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constructor lines + one new provider file (`AndroidSettingsStore.kt` —
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the `preferencesDataStore(name = "incido_settings")` Context extension,
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moved verbatim). The repository now takes an **injected**
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`DataStore<Preferences>`; the desktop creates the identical format with
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`PreferenceDataStoreFactory.create(corruptionHandler, produceFile)`
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(the Phase-0 API delta). `:app` gained `implementation(":core:settings")`
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— MainActivity reads `userSettingsFlow` and the type moved with the
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class, same reason `:core:domain` is there. `snapshot()`'s `runBlocking`
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kept for startup-only use. `dynamic_color` / `use_biometric` /
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`block_screenshots` ride in the file but have no desktop UI (hidden,
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not faked). Verified: `assembleDebug` + `:desktopApp:run … --self-test`
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+ `:core:data-jvm:smoke` green.
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**M3.2 — cipher seam: DONE.** `AesGcmFieldCipher` moved into
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`core/data/src/main/kotlin/…/crypto/` (compiled by BOTH modules) behind
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new `fun interface FieldKeyProvider { getOrCreateKey(): ByteArray }`;
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`EncryptionVerifier` (pure coroutines) moved with it. Android passes
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`objectBoxKeyProvider::getOrCreateKey` (SAM). Verified: `assembleDebug`
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+ desktop self-test green.
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**M3.3 — desktop key + wiring + UI: DONE.** `DesktopKeyProvider`: the
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32-byte key in `field.key` (temp+atomic-move, `0600` POSIX perms —
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visible as `-rw-------` in every `ls` below). KEYRING STATUS, STATED
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PLAINLY: no keyring library is in the catalog and no candidate was
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verified on this stack, so the plan's fallback (file + `0600`) stands;
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revisit in Phase 2 with `secret-service` behind a real test.
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`DesktopContainer` now mirrors `AppContainer` completely — settings →
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cipher auto-install (`isEncryptionActive` AND key on disk) BEFORE the
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repository → `NoteCryptoService` → `EncryptionVerifier.checkNow()`.
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`SecurityActions` menu: theme cycle (real shared `theme_mode` key —
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Material3 switches via `colorScheme`, there is no `darkTheme` param),
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encrypt/decrypt toggle (Android's enable/disable call order), recovery
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key import/export (with Android's overwrite-warning gate); no dynamic
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color, no biometrics, no screenshot blocking, no PIN — desktop hides
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all four. Window geometry → its own `incido_window.preferences_pb`
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(position deliberately not stored; KWin owns placement). Scripted legs
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(`--crypto-self-test` / separate-process `--crypto-reopen`):
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```
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=== leg A: enable === (fresh /tmp/incido-desktop-crypto)
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probe note written PASS id=1
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encrypt sweep flipped rows PASS
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verifier trial-decrypt sweep PASS verified=1 failed=0
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repository decrypts transparently PASS notes=1
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wrong key rejected (AEAD tag) PASS failed=1
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recovery envelope (INCKEY1) PASS len=84
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wrong passphrase rejected PASS
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envelope carries library key PASS
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CRYPTO LEG-A PASS (library left encrypted for leg B)
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=== leg B: reopen (separate process = the real relaunch) ===
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settings survived restart PASS
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cipher auto-installed PASS
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reopen verifier sweep all-ok PASS verified=1 failed=0
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decrypt sweep reverses it PASS
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CRYPTO LEG-B PASS
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```
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**M3.4 — recovery-key envelope file legs: DONE (desktop side).**
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`--key-export` / `--key-import` drive the menu's exact codec calls
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headlessly — export from one library, import into a FRESH one:
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```
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KEYENV exported=84B to /tmp/incido-recovery-key.incidokey (magic=INCKEY1 ok)
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KEYENV import ok wrong-pw=rejected verify verified=0 failed=0
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KEYENV import FAILED: AEADBadTagException: Tag mismatch! (wrong passphrase)
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-rw------- 1 nick nick 32 … /tmp/incido-key-dst/field.key (imported key is 0600)
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```
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**M3 exit criteria:** (1) "an encrypted desktop library passes
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`EncryptionVerifier`'s trial-decrypt sweep" — **met**, leg A step 3 +
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leg B (auto-install + full-library sweep on relaunch). (2) "a
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phone-exported recovery key decrypts … on desktop" — **met at format
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level** (one shared `EncryptedKeyCodec` source compiled into both
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platforms; 84-byte envelope, wrong-pw AEAD rejection, byte-identical
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key — above); the **physical phone leg is the one item pending**: the
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Waydroid container was FROZEN at session end and starting it is
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sudo-gated, so the phone→desktop `Settings → Export recovery key` run
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could not be executed here. Recipe for it (≈15 min with a live
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container, mirrors the M2.4b pass): enable encryption on the phone →
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export the recovery key to a shared-storage file → copy to host →
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`./gradlew :desktopApp:run --args="--data-dir /tmp/incido-phonekey
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--backup-import <phone-backup.incido.json> --key-import
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<recovery.incidokey> --crypto-passphrase <pw> --exit-after 25"` →
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enable encryption in that library → every imported note earns the badge.
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Honesty notes: (a) intermittent XWayland window flakiness struck this
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session's scripted runs three times — a startup wedge (never reached
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first composition) and two teardown wedges (all output flushed, never
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reached `exitApplication`); every occurrence passed cleanly on rerun,
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none touched the data paths, and the first predates all M3 code, so it
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is environmental (likely compositor power state after long uptime), not
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a regression. Scripted verification should retry once before believing
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a hang;
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(b) `field.key` protects at-rest notes only against someone reading the
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files — it cannot gate app opening (no desktop lock is wired; PIN gating
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is deferred); (c) the PBKDF2 recovery path costs ~55 ms per unlock here,
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so desktop may skip Android's async key handling for good.
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**Next up: M4** — `composeApp` → Compose Multiplatform (plan §6).
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@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ Commands that must stay green:
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./gradlew :spike:data-jvm:run --args="/tmp/incido-spike-db" # Phase-0 probes
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./gradlew :spike:data-jvm:run --args="/tmp/incido-spike-db" # Phase-0 probes
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./gradlew assembleDebug # Android — every single step
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./gradlew assembleDebug # Android — every single step
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./gradlew :desktopApp:createDistributable # packaging (M5)
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./gradlew :desktopApp:createDistributable # packaging (M5)
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# M3 (settings + at-rest encryption). Leg B must run as a SEPARATE process
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# after leg A (it proves the relaunch), against the same fresh data dir:
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./gradlew :desktopApp:run --args="--data-dir /tmp/incido-desktop-crypto --crypto-self-test --crypto-passphrase m3-script-pw --exit-after 20" # leg A (leaves lib encrypted)
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./gradlew :desktopApp:run --args="--data-dir /tmp/incido-desktop-crypto --crypto-reopen --exit-after 15" # leg B (verifies + decrypts back)
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```
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```
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Versions that matter: Compose Multiplatform `1.7.3`, AndroidX Compose BOM
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Versions that matter: Compose Multiplatform `1.7.3`, AndroidX Compose BOM
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@@ -128,7 +132,7 @@ is additive and forces `id = 0`. The only Android code in the path is
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Exit criteria: bidirectional lossless round-trip; importing twice adds nothing;
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Exit criteria: bidirectional lossless round-trip; importing twice adds nothing;
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`:core:backup` compiles for both platforms; Android backup screens unchanged.
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`:core:backup` compiles for both platforms; Android backup screens unchanged.
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## 5. M3 — settings + at-rest encryption on desktop
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## 5. M3 — settings + at-rest encryption on desktop — **DONE** (status + run logs in `DESKTOP_FEASIBILITY.md`; the physical phone→desktop recovery-key leg is the one pending manual run, recipe recorded there)
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**Settings.** Move `SettingsRepository` (116 LOC, 8 keys: `theme_mode`,
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**Settings.** Move `SettingsRepository` (116 LOC, 8 keys: `theme_mode`,
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`dynamic_color`, `security_enabled`, `encryption_enabled`, `pin_enabled`,
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`dynamic_color`, `security_enabled`, `encryption_enabled`, `pin_enabled`,
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@@ -238,6 +242,9 @@ abstraction, justify it in the commit message. Flag anything unverifiable
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instead of assuming it works.
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instead of assuming it works.
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**First actions for a new session:** `git log --oneline -6` → read
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**First actions for a new session:** `git log --oneline -6` → read
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`tools/DESKTOP_FEASIBILITY.md` → run `:core:data-jvm:smoke` and the
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`tools/DESKTOP_FEASIBILITY.md` → run `:core:data-jvm:smoke`, the
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`:desktopApp:run … --self-test` command above to confirm the tree matches this
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`:desktopApp:run … --self-test` command, and the M3 crypto legs above to
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description → start M2 task 1 (extract `:core:backup`).
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confirm the tree matches this description → start M4 task 1 (convert
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`:composeApp` in-place to `kotlin("multiplatform")` with
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`androidTarget()` + `jvm()`, per §6 order of attack — decide within a day
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of real friction whether to fall back to a `:ui-shared` module).
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Reference in new issue
Block a user