DesktopSettingsScreen composes the M4.4d common sections (Appearance
/ Backup / About + building blocks) plus desktop-only Encryption rows.
Android-incapable surfaces are hidden per 6.5: dynamic-color row
(onDynamicColor null), Carnet importer (onImportCarnet null),
SecuritySection entirely (no BiometricPrompt/FLAG_SECURE on the JVM).
Flow dedupe so settings drives the EXACT M2/M3 behaviour, not a copy:
- BackupActions split: BackupFlows/rememberBackupFlows owns the pick+
bridge + dialog machinery; the menu is now a thin skin (launchImport/
launchExportPlain/launchExportEncrypted + Dialogs()).
- SecurityActions split: SecurityKeyFlows owns the recovery-key export/
import dialogs (hasKey gate, overwrite warning, import leg);
toggleDesktopEncryption() keeps the enable/disable ordering.
- M4.4d sections became PUBLIC (desktopApp is a separate module).
Main.kt: gear button routes list-window <-> settings in-place (no nav
stack yet — desktop nav polish is M5). New scripted leg
--settings-smoke renders the screen headlessly before auto-exit.
Verified: assembleDebug :desktopApp:build SUCCESSFUL + :desktopApp:
run --self-test --settings-smoke (SELFTEST id=1, RENDER notes=1
selected=1, SETTINGS shown, ST_EXIT=0) + :core:data-jvm:smoke
(M1a PASS); models clean.
Milestone M3 task 3 (DESKTOP_PHASE_PLAN §5). Three pieces:
1. DesktopKeyProvider — the JVM FieldKeyProvider. The plan's keyring
condition is FAILed honestly: no keyring library is in the catalog
and the candidates are unverified on this stack, so the sanctioned
fallback applies: the 32-byte field key lives in `field.key` inside
the library dir, written via temp+atomic-move with 0600 POSIX perms
(File.setReadable/setWritable fallback for non-POSIX fs). It speaks
the phone's recovery format natively through EncryptedKeyCodec
(importRecoveryKey / exportRecoveryKey — INCKEY1, PBKDF2-200k,
AES-GCM, wrong passphrase throws before anything is written).
Key retention on disable: the sweep decrypts first, then flags
clear, but the key file stays (Android's deleteKey-on-disable is
Keystore-scoped; keeping it lets users re-enable and re-export).
Stated, not silent.
2. DesktopContainer now mirrors AppContainer fully: settings -> cipher
auto-install from snapshot (isEncryptionActive AND key on disk)
BEFORE the repository -> NoteCryptoService -> EncryptionVerifier ->
checkNow at startup. shutdown() cancels appScope.
3. UI: SecurityActions menu (theme cycle + encrypt/decrypt toggle +
recovery-key import/export, incl. Android's overwrite-warning gate)
reusing the backup menu's pickFile/PassphraseDialog (now internal,
parameterized title/extensions). theme_mode drives Material3 via
colorScheme (M3 MaterialTheme has no darkTheme param). dynamic_color
/ use_biometric / block_screenshots are NOT shown — no JVM
equivalent, hide-don't-fake. Window geometry persists to its own
incido_window.preferences_pb (desktop-only state; position left to
KWin).
Verification (scripted legs in Main.kt, --crypto-self-test / --crypto-reopen):
leg A: probe note -> key+cipher+sweep -> verifier trial-decrypt
PASS (verified=1 failed=0) -> transparent repo read -> WRONG KEY
REJECTED via AEAD tag -> INCKEY1 envelope 84 bytes, wrong-pw
rejected, key byte-match -> LEG-A PASS.
leg B (separate process = real relaunch): settings survived, cipher
auto-installed, sweep all-ok, decrypt sweep reverses it -> PASS.
:desktopApp:run --self-test regression green; assembleDebug green.
ls confirms field.key is -rw------- (0600).
One environmental note: a leg-A run earlier in the session wedged in
XWayland window teardown (never reached exitApplication); the rerun
auto-exited cleanly — same one-off as the M3.2 startup wedge.
Phase 1 M2 task 3 (tools/DESKTOP_PHASE_PLAN.md §4). Logic lives in
BackupBridge so both platforms get it through the one bridge:
- BackupBridge.import gains skipExisting (default true) and returns
ImportSummary(imported, skipped). A note is skipped when the library
already holds the key (createdAt, updatedAt, sha256(content)) — the
triple the export preserves verbatim, trustworthy only since the M2
import-timestamp fix. Keys are snapshotted BEFORE importing, so two
genuinely identical notes inside one file still both import into a
fresh library; only a second import of the same file is a no-op.
Snapshotted keys include trashed notes. skipExisting=false restores
the old additive behaviour (the documented override).
- Android: BackupManager.import passes the flag and returns the summary
(signature-identical call for SettingsViewModel); its snackbar now
reports the skip count. Screen layouts untouched — exit criterion
"Android backup screens unchanged" holds.
- Desktop: the import confirm dialog swaps its "duplicates persist"
warning for a working "Skip notes that are already here" checkbox
(default ON); scripted path prints the re-import outcome.
- Format unchanged: formatVersion stays 1 (streaming/dedupe-at-format
level stays a Phase-2 formatVersion=2 idea).
Verification passed: :core:data-jvm:backupSmoke (new step — re-import
skipped=27, override added 27, store=54; RESULT M2 round-trip PASS on
the real export) + :desktopApp:run --args="--data-dir /tmp/incido-m2t3
--backup-import <export> --backup-export … --exit-after 8" (imported=27
skipped=0 → exported=27 → reimport imported=0 skipped=27, clean exit) +
assembleDebug + :core:data-jvm:smoke + :desktopApp:run --self-test —
all green; output recorded in DESKTOP_FEASIBILITY.md.
Known limitation (by design): attachments are not in the key.
Phase 1 M2 task 2 (tools/DESKTOP_PHASE_PLAN.md §4): :desktopApp can now
speak the phone's backup format through the extracted bridge.
- New BackupActions.kt: top-bar overflow menu (Import from file… /
Export plain / Export encrypted). Import = AWT FileDialog ->
BackupBridge.preview -> passphrase dialog on INCDBK1 (wrong passphrase
stays open for retry) -> BackupPreview confirm dialog -> import.
Export = save-picker -> exportPlain / passphrase + exportEncrypted.
All heavy bridge calls run on Dispatchers.IO; results via Snackbar.
- Same package-level BackupBridge calls Android's BackupManager shim
makes — format shared by construction, not reimplementation. Android's
PassphraseDialog.kt deliberately NOT ported (M4 moves the real one to
common code).
- :desktopApp gains implementation(:core:backup).
- Scripted headless path for CI: --backup-import/--backup-export drive
the identical bridge calls without dialog clicking.
Verification passed: :desktopApp:run --args="--data-dir /tmp/...
--backup-import <real phone export> --backup-export /tmp/m2t4-exp.json
--exit-after 8" (preview 27 / imported 27 / exported 27, clean exit) +
:core:data-jvm:backupSmoke on the DESKTOP-written export (all PASS) +
python cross-check: notes (createdAt,updatedAt,content) and attachment
Base64 identical phone->desktop->phone + assembleDebug +
:core:data-jvm:smoke + :desktopApp:run --self-test — all green.
Output recorded in DESKTOP_FEASIBILITY.md (incl. one unreproduced
first-run exit hang to watch in M5).