Closes milestone M3 (DESKTOP_PHASE_PLAN §5). Code (one addition): --key-export / --key-import CLI legs in Main.kt — the SecurityActions menu's exact codec calls, headless. This makes the pending physical-phone leg a one-liner once a Waydroid container is live (recipe recorded in the feasibility doc). Docs: DESKTOP_FEASIBILITY.md gains the M3.1–M3.4 status section with the actual run output (leg A/B, KEYENV logs, 0600 ls lines); plan §1 lists the two crypto legs among the must-stay-green commands; §5 marked DONE; first-actions now point a fresh session at M4 task 1. Exit criteria, per the plan's wording: - encrypted desktop library passes EncryptionVerifier's trial-decrypt sweep: MET (leg A verified=1 failed=0, wrong key -> AEAD failure count, leg B relaunch all-ok). - phone-exported recovery key decrypts on desktop: MET at format level (shared codec source, 84B INCKEY1 envelope, AEADBadTagException on wrong passphrase, byte-identical key into a fresh 0600 file); the physical phone export is FLAGGED pending (Waydroid container FROZEN, start is sudo-gated) with the exact re-run recipe — not assumed done. Verified: ./gradlew assembleDebug, :core:data-jvm:smoke, :spike:data-jvm:run, :desktopApp:run --self-test, and both crypto legs — all green in one final pass (one self-test teardown hang under the compositor, rc=124, clean on immediate rerun — recorded, environmental).
610 lines
33 KiB
Markdown
610 lines
33 KiB
Markdown
# Desktop feasibility spike (Phase 0) — findings
|
||
|
||
> The forward plan — remaining Phase-1 milestones, invariants and traps —
|
||
> lives in `tools/DESKTOP_PHASE_PLAN.md`, written as a cold-start handoff.
|
||
|
||
Branch `spike/desktop-feasibility`. Throwaway code lives in `spike/` and is
|
||
**not** wired into the Android build: `settings.gradle.kts` only gained two
|
||
`include()` lines and `gradle/libs.versions.toml` four entries. Nothing under
|
||
`app/`, `core/` or `composeApp/` was touched.
|
||
|
||
Question asked: can Incido become a Compose Multiplatform desktop app without
|
||
abandoning ObjectBox, its encryption layer, or its UI layer?
|
||
|
||
## Verdict
|
||
|
||
| # | Question | Verdict | Evidence |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| Q1 | Compose Multiplatform window builds + renders on KDE/Wayland | **PASS** | `:spike:compose-jvm:run` opened a window; `WINDOW-READY density=1.0` printed from the first composition |
|
||
| Q2 | ObjectBox: kapt codegen + native runtime on plain JVM, reusing the existing model file | **PASS** | `build BoxStore (codegen + native) PASS`; ID model file unchanged across modules |
|
||
| Q3 | Does the app's own crypto format survive on the JVM (key envelope interop) | **PASS** | `EncryptedKeyCodec.kt` copied verbatim: 32-byte key → 84-byte envelope → same key; wrong passphrase → `AEADBadTagException` |
|
||
| Q4 | Theme layer + `core:domain` compile and drive real Material3 UI on JVM | **PASS** | `Color.kt`/`Type.kt`/`NoteColors.kt` copied verbatim; only 2 Android-only lines removed from `Theme.kt` |
|
||
| Q5 | Platform layer: settings store, clipboard, image decode without Android | **PASS with 3 API deltas** | DataStore writes/reads 3 keys with no `Context`; Compose clipboard round-trip PASS |
|
||
| Q6 | jpackage Linux distribution, native lib bundled and loadable | **PASS** | 168 MB app-image; `SPIKE-DB PASS — BoxStore built inside the image` |
|
||
|
||
**Bottom line: the conversion is feasible.** No blocker found. Phase 1 can be a
|
||
port, not a rewrite — the data layer, crypto, domain, theme and Material3 UI all
|
||
work as-is on the JVM.
|
||
|
||
## Q1/Q4 — Compose Desktop UI
|
||
|
||
`:spike:compose-jvm` reproduces the surface set Incido actually uses: `Scaffold`
|
||
+ top bar, `NavigationRail`, note-card list with colour stripe and title/body
|
||
split, hashtag chips, favourite toggles, colour-filter chip strip, overflow
|
||
`DropdownMenu`, a confirm dialog, `SnackbarHost`, editor `OutlinedTextField`, and
|
||
the wide-window two-pane layout.
|
||
|
||
Run log (KDE Plasma, Wayland session, XWayland AWT):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
AWT toolkit : sun.awt.X11.XToolkit
|
||
Skiko : Library resolved
|
||
WINDOW-READY density=1.0 notes=6 — first composition succeeded
|
||
clipboard : PASS (read back: incido-spike-clipboard)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
No GL workarounds were needed (`-Dskiko.renderingApi=software` unused). Density
|
||
was 1.0 under XWayland — HiDPI scaling under native Wayland is untested and
|
||
should be checked in Phase 1 (§6 risk list).
|
||
|
||
Three real API deltas found while porting the UI, all mechanical:
|
||
|
||
1. `Dialog` is `androidx.compose.ui.window.Dialog`, not a material3 export
|
||
(material3 ships `AlertDialog`/`BasicAlertDialog`). Incido's dialogs use
|
||
`AlertDialog`, so this only bites hand-rolled overlays.
|
||
2. CompositionLocals cannot be read inside `LaunchedEffect` — `LocalDensity.current`
|
||
had to be captured at composition time. Same rule applies on Android; the
|
||
spike just happened to be the first place it was violated.
|
||
3. `VerticalDivider`/`HorizontalDivider` naming differs between the versions the
|
||
app and the spike resolve — a rename, not a redesign.
|
||
|
||
## Q2 — ObjectBox on the JVM
|
||
|
||
`spike/data-jvm` applies `org.jetbrains.kotlin.kapt`, points
|
||
`objectbox-plugin.json`-equivalent config at a **copy** of the app's
|
||
`objectbox-models/default.json`, and generates against the real entities
|
||
(`NoteEntity`, `HashtagEntity`, `AttachmentEntity`, `NoteCrossRefEntity`).
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
build BoxStore (codegen + native) PASS — native lib loaded
|
||
put NoteEntity (plaintext row) PASS — id=1
|
||
put NoteEntity (cipherVersion=1) PASS — id=2
|
||
blob round-trip integrity PASS — 4096 bytes identical
|
||
close + reopen same directory PASS — notes=2 hashtags=1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The generator printed **"ID model file unchanged"**, so generating in a second
|
||
module does not churn UIDs — the property that makes a shared-source Phase 1
|
||
(option B, sibling modules over a common `kotlin()` source set) safe. A desktop
|
||
build can open the same `.objectbox` file the Android app writes.
|
||
|
||
Gotchas recorded for Phase 1:
|
||
|
||
* Apply kapt with `apply(plugin = "org.jetbrains.kotlin.kapt")`; the
|
||
`alias(libs.plugins.kotlinKapt)` form fails with "already on classpath with
|
||
unknown version".
|
||
* kapt logs `W: Kapt currently doesn't support language version 2.0+` and falls
|
||
back to 1.9 for the generated code. Harmless, but expect it.
|
||
* The generator emits `MyObjectBox` into the **entity package**
|
||
(`org.incido.data.entity`), not `org.incido.data`.
|
||
* Resolved versions: `objectbox-java/kotlin/linux 4.0.3`, runtime reports
|
||
`4.0.2-2024-10-15`. `hasEncryption()` is **not** present in the JVM build —
|
||
ObjectBox encryption is an Android/extra-tier feature, so Incido's
|
||
app-level field encryption (`AesGcmFieldCipher`) is the only cipher, which is
|
||
exactly what we want anyway.
|
||
|
||
## Q3/Q5b — Crypto portability
|
||
|
||
`EncryptedKeyCodec.kt` was copied in **unmodified** (it imports only
|
||
`javax.crypto` + `java.security`) and exercised end-to-end:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
recovery-key envelope (real codec) PASS — envelope=84 bytes, 32-byte key round-tripped
|
||
wrong passphrase is rejected PASS — rejected with AEADBadTagException
|
||
AES-256-GCM field cipher layout PASS — 4KB ok; 500 encrypts in 81 ms
|
||
PBKDF2 200k cost (per unlock) PASS — samples=[53, 56] ms per unlock on this CPU
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Consequences for Phase 1:
|
||
|
||
* A recovery key exported from the phone opens encrypted notes on desktop with
|
||
**zero format changes** — same magic header, same PBKDF2 parameters, same
|
||
envelope. Backup/restore interop between platforms comes for free.
|
||
* `AesGcmFieldCipher`'s blob layout (`nonce(12) | ciphertext | tag`) was
|
||
mirrored and round-tripped. The class is not portable only because it reaches
|
||
for `ObjectBoxKeyProvider` (Android Keystore); the fix is a `KeyProvider`
|
||
interface with a JVM implementation, not a re-crypto.
|
||
* PBKDF2 with 200k iterations costs **~55 ms** on desktop versus roughly two
|
||
seconds on the phone. A passphrase-derived desktop master key (unlock at
|
||
launch) is viable without the async gymnastics the Android side needs.
|
||
* Not portable: BiometricPrompt, `FLAG_SECURE` screenshot blocking, and the
|
||
Android Keystore itself. Desktop needs its own answers (keyring via
|
||
`secret-service`, or a passphrase), and "block screenshots" has no equivalent.
|
||
|
||
## Q5a — Settings without a Context
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
data dir — would be /home/nick/.local/share/incido
|
||
DataStore prefs (no Context) PASS — 3 keys, file=incido_settings.preferences_pb (73 bytes)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
API delta worth knowing before Phase 1: the multiplatform artifact
|
||
`androidx.datastore:datastore-preferences-core` has **no**
|
||
`preferencesDataStore(name = …)` extension and **no** public
|
||
`PreferenceSerializer`. The JVM entry point is
|
||
`PreferenceDataStoreFactory.create(corruptionHandler, produceFile = { File })`
|
||
(plus a `createWithPath` overload taking an `okio.Path`), and the corruption
|
||
handler lives in `androidx.datastore.core.handlers`. Keys and the
|
||
`.preferences_pb` format are identical to Android, so `SettingsRepository` needs
|
||
only its store-construction line changed — the `Preferences.Key` definitions and
|
||
all read/write logic port verbatim.
|
||
|
||
Clipboard: Compose's `LocalClipboardManager` round-tripped (write → read →
|
||
compare) on desktop, so "copy to clipboard" needs no expect/actual. It is
|
||
deprecated in this Compose version in favour of `LocalClipboard` + `ClipEntry`;
|
||
that migration is the same on both platforms.
|
||
|
||
Image decode: the spike decodes attachment bytes via
|
||
`org.jetbrains.skia.Image.makeFromEncoded(bytes).toComposeImageBitmap()` — the
|
||
desktop replacement for `BitmapFactory.decodeByteArray`. Compiling code path;
|
||
runtime decode only runs when `--image <file>` is passed.
|
||
|
||
## Q6 — Packaging
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
./gradlew :spike:compose-jvm:createDistributable → 168 MB app-image
|
||
SPIKE-DB PASS — BoxStore built inside the image, notes=0
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`jpackage` built a self-contained Linux app-image (bundled jlink runtime) with no
|
||
extra host tooling — no FUSE, no `rpmbuild`, no Docker. `objectbox-linux` rides
|
||
along as a jar carrying `native/libobjectbox-jni-linux-x64.so` (2.5 MB), and
|
||
ObjectBox self-extracts it at runtime **from inside the image**, which was the
|
||
specific thing at risk. `packageDistributionForCurrentOS` (deb/rpm) additionally
|
||
needs `rpmbuild`/`dpkg` and still cannot cross-compile — per-platform runners
|
||
(GitHub Actions matrix), not one build host.
|
||
|
||
Noise worth recording: the launcher prints `pure virtual method called` /
|
||
`terminate called without an active exception` on stderr when the app calls
|
||
`exitProcess` while AWT/GTK is tearing down. Exit code is 0 and all output is
|
||
complete; a real app should close the window and let the JVM exit naturally.
|
||
|
||
## Phase 1 recommendation
|
||
|
||
Confirmed shape: **sibling JVM modules sharing sources**, not one KMP module per
|
||
layer.
|
||
|
||
1. `core:domain` is already JVM-clean — convert it first (multiplatform, or keep
|
||
it `kotlin("jvm")` and consume it from both targets). Zero code changes.
|
||
2. Keep ObjectBox entities + generated code in one JVM-consumable module and add
|
||
the spike-proven deps (`objectbox-java`, `objectbox-kotlin`,
|
||
`objectbox-linux`); Android keeps `objectbox-android`. The model file is the
|
||
shared contract — never regenerate UIDs.
|
||
3. Extract a `KeyProvider` interface so `AesGcmFieldCipher` becomes portable:
|
||
Android Keystore on one side, keyring/passphrase on the other.
|
||
4. Put `SettingsRepository`'s store construction behind an injected
|
||
`DataStore<Preferences>` factory (expect/actual if the code moves to common).
|
||
5. UI: budget ~15 files of real `android.*` coupling (context/resources,
|
||
`Build.VERSION`, BiometricPrompt, `FLAG_SECURE`, `LocalClipboardManager`) plus
|
||
window management — multi-window, tray, shortcuts — which has no Android
|
||
analogue and is the largest genuinely new UI work.
|
||
6. Compose Multiplatform 1.7.3 works but is behind. Decide in Phase 1 whether to
|
||
move the app to 1.8.x first; the spike proves feasibility on the pinned
|
||
version, not that 1.7.3 is the right target.
|
||
|
||
Still unproven after this spike: native-Wayland rendering and HiDPI (only
|
||
XWayland was exercised), macOS/Windows targets (nothing here is platform
|
||
specific except jpackage's no-cross-compile rule), perf on a multi-thousand-note
|
||
library, and the desktop security story (no Keystore, no biometrics, no
|
||
screenshot blocking).
|
||
|
||
## Re-running the spike
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
./gradlew :spike:data-jvm:run --args="/tmp/incido-spike-db" # S1 + S4 (Q2, Q3, Q5a/b)
|
||
./gradlew :spike:compose-jvm:run --args="--exit-after 6" # S2 (Q1, Q4, clipboard)
|
||
./gradlew :spike:compose-jvm:run --args="--image /path/x.png" # attachment decode
|
||
./gradlew :spike:compose-jvm:createDistributable # S5 (Q6)
|
||
spike/compose-jvm/build/compose/binaries/main/app/incido-spike/bin/incido-spike \
|
||
--probe-db --exit-after 4 # ObjectBox inside the image
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`spike/` is meant to be deleted once Phase 1 lands; keep this file.
|
||
|
||
## Phase 1 status (same branch)
|
||
|
||
**M1a — platform-neutral data layer: DONE.** `:core:data` now splits its
|
||
sources: `src/main/kotlin` is platform-neutral and is compiled by BOTH
|
||
`:core:data` (Android) and the new `:core:data-jvm` (desktop); Android-only
|
||
implementations live in `src/androidMain/kotlin`. Two seams were needed, both
|
||
found by this spike:
|
||
|
||
* `ObjectBoxStore` — same FQN in both modules, `Context` on Android, a
|
||
`File` directory on desktop. The modules are never on one classpath, which is
|
||
also what keeps `objectbox-android` and `objectbox-java` (same
|
||
`io.objectbox.*` classes) from colliding.
|
||
* `ImageOrientationNormalizer` — EXIF rotation needs a bitmap decoder; Android
|
||
passes `AndroidImageOrientationNormalizer` (moved verbatim from
|
||
`NoteRepositoryImpl`), desktop passes `NoOp` until M4 grows a JVM decoder.
|
||
|
||
`./gradlew :core:data-jvm:smoke` output: the real `NoteRepositoryImpl`
|
||
(save + hashtags + attachment round-trip + close/reopen) **PASS** on the JVM,
|
||
with the generator reporting `ID model file unchanged` — confirming the two
|
||
modules generate from one schema. `assembleDebug` stays green.
|
||
|
||
Also fixed while here: `.gitignore` had `**/objectbox-models/`, which meant the
|
||
schema contract was **not in version control** — a fresh clone regenerated
|
||
UIDs. `default.json` is now tracked (everything else in that directory stays
|
||
ignored). This matters more now that two modules generate against it.
|
||
|
||
**M1b — desktop shell over the real repository: DONE.** New `:desktopApp`
|
||
(Compose Multiplatform, `compose.desktop` DSL, no explicit `application`
|
||
plugin — see the spike finding). `DesktopContainer` mirrors Android's
|
||
`AppContainer` construction order and owns its own library at
|
||
`$XDG_DATA_HOME/incido`; `--data-dir` opens any other library.
|
||
|
||
Verified headlessly (`--self-test` drives the same repository calls the "+"
|
||
button and the star make, `--exit-after` auto-closes):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
library : /tmp/incido-desktop-smoke # written by :core:data-jvm:smoke
|
||
RENDER notes=0 selected=null # first frame (collectAsState initial)
|
||
RENDER notes=1 selected=1 # ObjectBox flow delivered
|
||
SELFTEST wrote note id=2 # write path through the UI's calls
|
||
RENDER notes=2 selected=2 # and it came back through the flow
|
||
--- reopen ---
|
||
RENDER notes=2 selected=2 # persisted
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Two things that run proves beyond what the spike did: the desktop build reads a
|
||
library written by a *different* module's generated `MyObjectBox` (one schema,
|
||
two codegens), and ObjectBox's reactive flow feeds a Compose Desktop
|
||
composition. Note the first frame is always the empty initial value — anything
|
||
asserting on note counts must wait for the flow, not the first composition.
|
||
|
||
Still synthetic in this build: the theme (Material 3 defaults, not Incido's)
|
||
and the screens (this is a two-pane stand-in). Both are replaced by the M4
|
||
`composeApp` commonMain conversion. Not yet wired: settings, encryption (M3),
|
||
backups (M2), packaging (M5).
|
||
|
||
**M2 task 1 — extract `:core:backup`: DONE.** New plain-`kotlin("jvm")`
|
||
module holding `BackupCodec.kt`, `EncryptedBackupCodec.kt` and
|
||
`EncryptedKeyCodec.kt` (`git mv` — the Android diff is the three moves plus
|
||
one dependency line) and a new `BackupBridge`: the four `BackupManager`
|
||
operations re-expressed over `InputStream`/`OutputStream` instead of `Uri`.
|
||
The package name `org.incido.compose.data.backup` was kept on purpose, so no
|
||
consumer import changed; `BackupManager` stays in `:composeApp` as a thin
|
||
`Uri → stream` SAF shim with an identical public API (`BackupPreview` moved
|
||
to the bridge file, same package). Dedupe is task 3, desktop picker UI is
|
||
task 2 — deliberately not here.
|
||
|
||
Verification (all after the move, from a clean state):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
./gradlew :core:backup:build BUILD SUCCESSFUL (serializers generated in the new module)
|
||
./gradlew assembleDebug BUILD SUCCESSFUL — Android unchanged
|
||
./gradlew :core:data-jvm:smoke RESULT: M1a PASS — the shared data layer runs on the JVM
|
||
./gradlew :desktopApp:run --args="--data-dir /tmp/incido-desktop-smoke --self-test --exit-after 6"
|
||
SELFTEST wrote note id=1 → RENDER notes=1 selected=1
|
||
./gradlew :spike:data-jvm:run … recovery-key envelope (real codec) PASS — 84-byte envelope,
|
||
32-byte key round-tripped; wrong passphrase → AEADBadTagException
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Housekeeping found on the way: `:core:data-jvm:smoke` does not clear
|
||
`build/data-jvm-smoke/`, and the script asserts on a fresh library — a
|
||
second consecutive run fails with "expected 1 note, got 2". Run it against
|
||
a deleted directory (worth fixing in a later milestone).
|
||
|
||
**M2 — real-data round-trip probe + import-timestamp fix: DONE.** New
|
||
`./gradlew :core:data-jvm:backupSmoke --args="<export.incido.json> [libDir]"`
|
||
feeds a **real** phone export (27 notes, 1 attachment, 14 orphan tags,
|
||
TASK_LIST+TEXT, colors, 1 favourite — file kept out of the repo, it's user
|
||
data) through the bridge on the JVM: preview → import into a fresh library
|
||
→ re-export and compare every field the format claims to preserve →
|
||
encrypted envelope export (wrong passphrase → `null` preview) → import of
|
||
the envelope into a second library with attachment-byte equality.
|
||
|
||
The probe immediately caught a **pre-existing Android bug**: `upsert` /
|
||
`saveNoteWithHashtags` overwrote `createdAt` AND `updatedAt` with "now"
|
||
for every insert, so even the phone's own import re-stamped the whole
|
||
library — silently breaking the `(createdAt, updatedAt, sha256(content))`
|
||
dedupe key M2 task 3 is built on. Fixed in the shared repository: a
|
||
caller-supplied non-zero timestamp is honoured, `0` still means "now"
|
||
(the Android editor already stamps both fields itself, verified at its two
|
||
`Note(…)` sites — so only the import path changes). Same for
|
||
`addAttachment`, which now takes `createdAt: Long = 0L` and
|
||
`importSnapshot` passes the phone's value through.
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
preview (plain, no passphrase) PASS — notes=27 attachments=1 app=0.4.0.0
|
||
import into fresh JVM library PASS — imported 27 notes, all readable back through the flow
|
||
re-export plain == original PASS — all 27 notes + 1 attachments identical
|
||
(content/times/fav/color/type/trash/draft/tags/bytes)
|
||
encrypted export + wrong-pw reject PASS — envelope=366739B, wrong passphrase → null
|
||
import encrypted into 2nd library PASS — attachment 260121B byte-identical to the phone's
|
||
RESULT: M2 round-trip PASS
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Still open from the probe: `importSnapshot` never recreates *orphaned*
|
||
hashtag rows (the export carries them, the import ignores them) —
|
||
pre-existing on Android, noted for task 3. After the fix, full suite green:
|
||
`assembleDebug`, `:core:data-jvm:smoke`, desktop `--self-test`,
|
||
`:spike:data-jvm:run` — and the ObjectBox generator kept printing
|
||
`ID model file unchanged`.
|
||
|
||
**M2 task 2 — desktop Import/Export UI: DONE.** `:desktopApp` gained the
|
||
`:core:backup` dependency, a top-bar overflow menu (Import from file… /
|
||
Export plain / Export encrypted, `BackupActions.kt`) with Material3
|
||
passphrase + confirm dialogs, and AWT `FileDialog` (native GTK under
|
||
XWayland) driven on the IO dispatcher. Every flow ends in the same
|
||
`BackupBridge` calls the Android shim makes — the format is shared by
|
||
construction. The confirm dialog reuses `BackupPreview` counts and plainly
|
||
states that duplicates persist until task 3.
|
||
|
||
Scripted verification (`--backup-import/--backup-export`, the same bridge
|
||
calls as the menu, no dialog clicking):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
./gradlew :desktopApp:run --args="--data-dir /tmp/incido-m2-import4 --backup-import <real phone export> --backup-export /tmp/m2t4-exp.json --exit-after 8"
|
||
BACKUP preview notes=27 attachments=1 app=0.4.0.0
|
||
BACKUP imported=27 (same calls as the Import… menu)
|
||
RENDER notes=27 selected=1
|
||
BACKUP exported=27 notes to /tmp/m2t4-exp.json → exits cleanly
|
||
|
||
:core:data-jvm:backupSmoke on the DESKTOP-written file: all PASS
|
||
python cross-check phone file vs desktop export: notes (createdAt,
|
||
updatedAt, content) identical = True; attachment Base64 identical = True
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
That closes the **phone → desktop → phone half of task 4** for plain
|
||
format: byte-identical notes + attachment through the real app. Remaining
|
||
task 4 items: encrypted file in each direction via the UI, and the
|
||
phone-side re-import check on a device.
|
||
|
||
One anomaly worth recording: the very first scripted run hung post-export
|
||
(no thread dump obtainable; ~0.8% CPU, idle). Three subsequent identical
|
||
runs exited in 10s; the classic `--self-test --exit-after` path was also
|
||
re-verified green. Unreproduced — keep an eye on it during M5 (the trap
|
||
list already has an exit-time AWT/`exitProcess` quirk).
|
||
|
||
Full suite green after the change: `assembleDebug`, `:core:data-jvm:smoke`,
|
||
`backupSmoke`, `:desktopApp:run --self-test`.
|
||
|
||
**M2 task 3 — import dedupe: DONE.** `BackupBridge.import` now skips notes
|
||
whose `(createdAt, updatedAt, sha256(content))` key already exists in the
|
||
library (default ON, `skipExisting = false` overrides), and returns
|
||
`ImportSummary(imported, skipped)` instead of a bare count. The existing
|
||
keys are snapshotted BEFORE the import, so two genuinely identical notes
|
||
inside one file still import into a fresh library — only a second import
|
||
of the same file adds nothing (matches the §4 wording exactly). Keys
|
||
include trashed notes, so restoring around the trash can't duplicate.
|
||
`BackupManager.import` (Android shim) passes the flag through and returns
|
||
the summary; `SettingsViewModel`'s snackbar gained the skip count (one
|
||
line — the screen layouts are untouched). The desktop confirm dialog
|
||
replaced its "duplicates persist" warning with a working
|
||
"Skip notes that are already here" checkbox (default ON); the export
|
||
format did not change (`formatVersion` stays 1).
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
backupSmoke new step: re-import skipped=27; override added 27 (store=54) PASS
|
||
:desktopApp:run --backup-import <real export> --backup-export … --exit-after 8
|
||
BACKUP imported=27 skipped=0 → exported=27 → reimport imported=0 skipped=27
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Known limitation (by design, per plan): attachments are not part of the
|
||
key — two notes with identical text AND timestamps but different
|
||
attachments dedupe as one. Phone side: second import now says
|
||
"Imported 0 note(s), skipped 27 already imported." — device smoke still
|
||
pending with the rest of task 4.
|
||
|
||
Full suite green: `backupSmoke` (9 steps incl. dedupe), `assembleDebug`,
|
||
`:core:data-jvm:smoke`, scripted desktop run (clean exit),
|
||
`:desktopApp:run --self-test`.
|
||
|
||
**M2 task 4 (desktop leg) — encrypted round-trip via the app: DONE.**
|
||
New scripted flags `--backup-export-enc <path>` + `--backup-passphrase
|
||
<pw>` drive the passphrase dialogs' exact call chain headlessly:
|
||
`exportEncrypted` writes a real ICDBKP1 envelope, and importing it back
|
||
exercises `preview(stream, pw)` → `import(stream, pw)` → wrong-passphrase
|
||
preview → deduped re-import, in fresh libraries across two launches:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
run A: plain import 27 → reimport skipped=27 → exported-enc=27 (magic=ICDBKP1 ok)
|
||
run B: preview encrypted=true → imported=27 → wrong-pw preview=null (rejected)
|
||
→ reimport imported=0 skipped=27
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Caught while writing it: `EncryptedBackupCodec` zeroes the passphrase
|
||
`CharArray` it consumes — **both in `encrypt` AND `decrypt`** — so every
|
||
call needs a fresh array. The UI already complies (dialogs re-derive
|
||
`toCharArray()` per call); the scripted block initially reused one array
|
||
and died on the second decrypt with `AEADBadTagException`. Worth
|
||
remembering for the phone device pass and any future caller: treat the
|
||
passphrase array as single-use fuel. The envelope desktop produces is
|
||
byte-format-identical to the phone's because both sides now compile the
|
||
same `:core:backup` codec — the remaining proof for task 4 is the
|
||
on-device leg (Waydroid: phone re-imports a desktop-made encrypted file
|
||
+ dedupe snackbar), tracked as M2 task 4b.
|
||
|
||
**M2 task 5 — export memory: MEASURED, recorded, no redesign (per plan).**
|
||
New `:core:data-jvm:backupMemory` probe synthesizes worst-case ObjectBox
|
||
libraries (fixed seed) and samples heap-used at 1 ms while
|
||
`BackupBridge.exportPlain` — the phone's own export path — runs:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
heap ceiling : 2048 MB
|
||
phone-at-gate (20 notes, 3 att x 8 MB) | data≈ 24 MB → 520 ms | peak 230 MB (+219) | file 32 MB
|
||
many notes (2000 notes, no att) | data≈ 2 MB → 205 ms | peak 140 MB (+104) | file 3 MB
|
||
phone-heavy (100 notes, 10 att x 8 MB)| data≈ 80 MB → 1100 ms | peak 777 MB (+765) | file 106 MB
|
||
watch tier (200 notes, 40 att x 8 MB)| data≈320 MB → OutOfMemoryError at -Xmx2g
|
||
process peak RSS (VmHWM): 1707 MB
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Findings:
|
||
- **Attachments, not note count, drive memory.** 2000 text notes cost
|
||
140 MB peak — trivial. Export allocation runs ~9–10x attachment bytes
|
||
(store load → base64 String → UTF-8 bytes → JsonElement tree ≈ four
|
||
live copies plus serializer churn).
|
||
- The plan's >250 MB gate trips at ≈25–30 MB of attachments. The phone
|
||
declares no `largeHeap`, so its default (~192–256 MB) heap OOMs around
|
||
the same point — a **pre-existing Android limitation**, unchanged by
|
||
Phase 1 (the bridge moved the code, not its memory profile).
|
||
- Real-world headroom: the user's actual library exports at 366 KB
|
||
(27 notes + one 260 KB attachment) → peak well under 50 MB. Roughly
|
||
1000x headroom before the gate.
|
||
- Bonus finding: a ~1.6 GB attachment library first dies in **ObjectBox
|
||
JVM** (`DbFullException` — objectbox-java caps DB size), not in the
|
||
bridge. The phone's objectbox-android has its own ceiling; irrelevant
|
||
at current scales.
|
||
|
||
Verdict: record, don't redesign (plan wording honoured). The streaming
|
||
formatVersion=2 idea stays parked for Phase 2 and becomes *required*
|
||
iff attachment libraries approach ~25 MB.
|
||
|
||
**M2 task 4b — on-device encrypted round-trip (Waydroid): DONE, one real
|
||
bug caught and fixed.** Manual UI pass on the Waydroid phone emulator
|
||
(rig + capture recipe in `tools/WAYDROID_TESTING.md`, injector in
|
||
`tools/inject2.c`). Phone exports encrypted, then re-imports the same
|
||
file through the real UI:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
export: Settings → Export to file… → Encrypted → passphrase → Encrypt &
|
||
export → SAF SAVE → snackbar "Encrypted backup exported. Store
|
||
the passphrase safely." (file lands 2.77 kB, magic ICDBKP1)
|
||
import: Import from file… → picker shows the .incido.json → app sniffs
|
||
the magic → "Decrypt backup" single-field sheet → correct pw →
|
||
preview "4 note(s) / 0 attachment(s) / Exported from v0.4.2.0 /
|
||
Oct 5, 2026" → Import →
|
||
snackbar "Imported 0 note(s), skipped 4 already imported."
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**The bug:** the encrypted import silently did nothing — the confirm
|
||
dialog closed but no import ran and no snackbar ever appeared.
|
||
`PassphraseDialog.onConfirm` runs a shared preamble that clears all four
|
||
URI slots (`pendingImportUri = null`, SettingsScreen.kt:383) *before*
|
||
routing on mode; the IMPORT branch previews from a local copy but never
|
||
re-arms the slot, so the confirm dialog's Import button read
|
||
`pendingImportUri == null` and skipped the whole `viewModel.import`
|
||
call. Plain-JSON imports never pass through the passphrase dialog, so
|
||
M2.1–M2.5 could not catch this — exactly why the device leg existed.
|
||
Fix: the IMPORT branch re-arms `pendingImportUri = importUri` before
|
||
launching the preview; wrong-passphrase and dismiss paths still null it
|
||
(and zero the retained chars). Verified fixed on-device with the
|
||
dedupe snackbar above.
|
||
|
||
Device-run notes (cost hours; recorded for M3's manual passes): taps
|
||
map 1:1 to screenshot pixels; TextButtons ignore Enter until Tab moves
|
||
focus onto them (keyboard nav is the reliable path); snackbars expire
|
||
before a 3 s-delayed screenshot — burst-capture spectacle at 1 s
|
||
intervals; `waydroid shell` needs sudo, but `waydroid app install` and
|
||
`pkill -f org.incido.app` from the host need none.
|
||
|
||
**M3.1 — `:core:settings`: DONE.** `UserSettings` + `SettingsRepository`
|
||
moved to a plain `kotlin("jvm")` module with package
|
||
`org.incido.compose.data.settings` kept, so the Android diff is two
|
||
constructor lines + one new provider file (`AndroidSettingsStore.kt` —
|
||
the `preferencesDataStore(name = "incido_settings")` Context extension,
|
||
moved verbatim). The repository now takes an **injected**
|
||
`DataStore<Preferences>`; the desktop creates the identical format with
|
||
`PreferenceDataStoreFactory.create(corruptionHandler, produceFile)`
|
||
(the Phase-0 API delta). `:app` gained `implementation(":core:settings")`
|
||
— MainActivity reads `userSettingsFlow` and the type moved with the
|
||
class, same reason `:core:domain` is there. `snapshot()`'s `runBlocking`
|
||
kept for startup-only use. `dynamic_color` / `use_biometric` /
|
||
`block_screenshots` ride in the file but have no desktop UI (hidden,
|
||
not faked). Verified: `assembleDebug` + `:desktopApp:run … --self-test`
|
||
+ `:core:data-jvm:smoke` green.
|
||
|
||
**M3.2 — cipher seam: DONE.** `AesGcmFieldCipher` moved into
|
||
`core/data/src/main/kotlin/…/crypto/` (compiled by BOTH modules) behind
|
||
new `fun interface FieldKeyProvider { getOrCreateKey(): ByteArray }`;
|
||
`EncryptionVerifier` (pure coroutines) moved with it. Android passes
|
||
`objectBoxKeyProvider::getOrCreateKey` (SAM). Verified: `assembleDebug`
|
||
+ desktop self-test green.
|
||
|
||
**M3.3 — desktop key + wiring + UI: DONE.** `DesktopKeyProvider`: the
|
||
32-byte key in `field.key` (temp+atomic-move, `0600` POSIX perms —
|
||
visible as `-rw-------` in every `ls` below). KEYRING STATUS, STATED
|
||
PLAINLY: no keyring library is in the catalog and no candidate was
|
||
verified on this stack, so the plan's fallback (file + `0600`) stands;
|
||
revisit in Phase 2 with `secret-service` behind a real test.
|
||
`DesktopContainer` now mirrors `AppContainer` completely — settings →
|
||
cipher auto-install (`isEncryptionActive` AND key on disk) BEFORE the
|
||
repository → `NoteCryptoService` → `EncryptionVerifier.checkNow()`.
|
||
`SecurityActions` menu: theme cycle (real shared `theme_mode` key —
|
||
Material3 switches via `colorScheme`, there is no `darkTheme` param),
|
||
encrypt/decrypt toggle (Android's enable/disable call order), recovery
|
||
key import/export (with Android's overwrite-warning gate); no dynamic
|
||
color, no biometrics, no screenshot blocking, no PIN — desktop hides
|
||
all four. Window geometry → its own `incido_window.preferences_pb`
|
||
(position deliberately not stored; KWin owns placement). Scripted legs
|
||
(`--crypto-self-test` / separate-process `--crypto-reopen`):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
=== leg A: enable === (fresh /tmp/incido-desktop-crypto)
|
||
probe note written PASS id=1
|
||
encrypt sweep flipped rows PASS
|
||
verifier trial-decrypt sweep PASS verified=1 failed=0
|
||
repository decrypts transparently PASS notes=1
|
||
wrong key rejected (AEAD tag) PASS failed=1
|
||
recovery envelope (INCKEY1) PASS len=84
|
||
wrong passphrase rejected PASS
|
||
envelope carries library key PASS
|
||
CRYPTO LEG-A PASS (library left encrypted for leg B)
|
||
|
||
=== leg B: reopen (separate process = the real relaunch) ===
|
||
settings survived restart PASS
|
||
cipher auto-installed PASS
|
||
reopen verifier sweep all-ok PASS verified=1 failed=0
|
||
decrypt sweep reverses it PASS
|
||
CRYPTO LEG-B PASS
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**M3.4 — recovery-key envelope file legs: DONE (desktop side).**
|
||
`--key-export` / `--key-import` drive the menu's exact codec calls
|
||
headlessly — export from one library, import into a FRESH one:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
KEYENV exported=84B to /tmp/incido-recovery-key.incidokey (magic=INCKEY1 ok)
|
||
KEYENV import ok wrong-pw=rejected verify verified=0 failed=0
|
||
KEYENV import FAILED: AEADBadTagException: Tag mismatch! (wrong passphrase)
|
||
-rw------- 1 nick nick 32 … /tmp/incido-key-dst/field.key (imported key is 0600)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**M3 exit criteria:** (1) "an encrypted desktop library passes
|
||
`EncryptionVerifier`'s trial-decrypt sweep" — **met**, leg A step 3 +
|
||
leg B (auto-install + full-library sweep on relaunch). (2) "a
|
||
phone-exported recovery key decrypts … on desktop" — **met at format
|
||
level** (one shared `EncryptedKeyCodec` source compiled into both
|
||
platforms; 84-byte envelope, wrong-pw AEAD rejection, byte-identical
|
||
key — above); the **physical phone leg is the one item pending**: the
|
||
Waydroid container was FROZEN at session end and starting it is
|
||
sudo-gated, so the phone→desktop `Settings → Export recovery key` run
|
||
could not be executed here. Recipe for it (≈15 min with a live
|
||
container, mirrors the M2.4b pass): enable encryption on the phone →
|
||
export the recovery key to a shared-storage file → copy to host →
|
||
`./gradlew :desktopApp:run --args="--data-dir /tmp/incido-phonekey
|
||
--backup-import <phone-backup.incido.json> --key-import
|
||
<recovery.incidokey> --crypto-passphrase <pw> --exit-after 25"` →
|
||
enable encryption in that library → every imported note earns the badge.
|
||
|
||
Honesty notes: (a) intermittent XWayland window flakiness struck this
|
||
session's scripted runs three times — a startup wedge (never reached
|
||
first composition) and two teardown wedges (all output flushed, never
|
||
reached `exitApplication`); every occurrence passed cleanly on rerun,
|
||
none touched the data paths, and the first predates all M3 code, so it
|
||
is environmental (likely compositor power state after long uptime), not
|
||
a regression. Scripted verification should retry once before believing
|
||
a hang;
|
||
(b) `field.key` protects at-rest notes only against someone reading the
|
||
files — it cannot gate app opening (no desktop lock is wired; PIN gating
|
||
is deferred); (c) the PBKDF2 recovery path costs ~55 ms per unlock here,
|
||
so desktop may skip Android's async key handling for good.
|
||
|
||
**Next up: M4** — `composeApp` → Compose Multiplatform (plan §6).
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|